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In South Africa, the 1998 National Water Act has created two user-driven water 
resource management organisations, namely the Water User Association at the local 
level and the Catchment Management Agency at a larger catchment level. The paper 
investigates some challenges concerning the participation of smallholders in water 
resource management organisations involving also large-scale users. Specifically, the 
paper analyses the possible discrepancies between the needs of smallholders with 
regard to water and the functions of these organisations. A simple typology of needs 
concerning water is presented and used to classify the main problems faced by 
smallholders in selected case studies. In some of the cases studied, smallholders need 
above all funds for investment in waterworks and their operation. They are not 
directly affected by water resource management issue, a lack of overlap between their 
needs and the functions of a water resource management organisation might lead to 
their unsustainable presence within the organisation. In such cases, one alternative is 
to achieve cross-subsidization. The National Water Act calls for it, without providing 
specific requirement. The proposed creation of small-scale user forums in the Olifants 
Water Management area can be described as cross-subsidization. It might improve the 
internal organisation among smallholders and give them a voice. Some funds will be 
dedicated to forums’ activities, but they are not entrenched as part of the core 
functions of the Catchment Management Agency. This analysis shows the importance 
of undertaking an assessment of smallholder water related needs to orientate the 




In South Africa, the 1998 National Water Act (NWA) launches a far-reaching 
reform of the water resource management. This Act aims at setting a more 
efficient system, with the definition of temporary water licences and the 
participation of users in the management of water resources. The Act creates 
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two Water Resource Management Organisations (WRMOs), which will be 
driven by the users in the long term: the Catchment Management Agency 
(CMA) and the Water User Association (WUA). At the catchment level, a 
CMA will be established in order to achieve the management of water 
resources in an integrated way (NWA, section 80). The WUAs are to be 
created at a more local level than the CMAs, in order to coordinate different 
users in the day-to-day management of an irrigation scheme, a river or a 
catchment. The WUA is an organisation, which will be used in two different 
situations. First, the management of the numerous smallholder schemes in the 
former homelands will be transferred to users. These users will form then a 
WUA to manage the scheme (DWAF, 2002).  Since in these schemes farmers 
farm on small areas (usually less than 2 ha), these WUAs will be referred 
hereafter as “smallholder WUAs”. Second, the WUAs will involve large-scale 
users and possibly also small-scale ones. These WUAs will be called hereafter 
“large-scale WUAs”. The bulk of these WUAs will come from the 
transformation of the Irrigation Boards (IBs) controlled by large-scale farmers, 
which used to manage water in many rivers. These IBs often administer large 
areas. Some large-scale WUAs may also be created around non-agricultural 
water use (for instance mines). 
 
The NWA aims also at “redressing the results of past racial and gender 
discrimination” (section 2). Indeed, South Africa has still to deal with the huge 
burden of the past apartheid regime, which created a highly uneven 
distribution of land and water rights between the large-scale farmers and the 
Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs) situated in the rural areas. 
This term regroups all the persons who were deprived of certain rights during 
the past dispensation, i.e. Black, Coloured, Asian people as well as the 
women.2 There is a strong commitment to include HDIs rural users in the new 
WRMOs (Karar, 2003). 
 
The set up of these WRMOs is currently delayed. At the beginning of 2003, no 
CMA is enacted. There are only one smallholder WUA, around 20 WUAs 
which come from former IBs (Karar, 2003) and one large-scale non-
agricultural WUA. On the one hand, the main constraint with regard to the 
creation of the smallholder WUAs is the financial sustainability of these future 
 
2 A formal definition is: “HDI means a South African citizen, who (i) due to the apartheid 
policy that had been in place, had no franchise in national election prior to the introduction of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1983 (Act 110 of 1983) or the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No 200 of 1993) (the interim Constitution); 
and/or (ii) is a female; and/or (iii) has a disability, provided that a person who obtained South 
African citizenship on or after the coming to effect of the interim Constitution, is not to be an 
HDI” (Free State Provincial Government, 2002). 
  53Agrekon, Vol 43, No 1 (March 2004)  Faysse 
 
 
associations (Perret, 2002), as in many other developing countries. On the 
other hand, the delay in the establishment of both the CMAs and the large-
scale WUAs is mainly due to the long-term challenges of achieving a 
meaningful participation of HDIs (Karar, 2003).  
 
In organisations where both large-scale and small-scale users are expected to 
participate (CMA, large-scale WUA), many analyses put forward the 
difficulties and weaknesses of the public participation process as a cause of 
the limited involvement of HDIs in the proposals (e.g. Van Koppen et al, 2002; 
Motteux, 2001; Goldin, 2003). This paper analyses the challenges vis-à-vis the 
involvement of HDIs in these organisations with a different approach, i.e. the 
existing discrepancies or overlaps between HDIs’ water related needs and the 
functions of these WRMOs. Indeed, the participation of the HDIs is 
meaningful only if the WRMO, which the HDIs are invited to join, is 
addressing problems that are of concern for them. On the one hand, the 
existence of an overlap between the HDIs’ needs and the WRMO’s functions 
is a prerequisite of the public participation process if the WRMO’s functions 
are defined from the outset. On the other hand, if there is a possibility of lack 
of overlap, the functions of the WRMO might be part of the discussion during 
the participation process. The paper investigates some cases of large-scale 
WRMOs, being either a CMA or a large-scale WUA. It does not address the 
situation of smallholder WUAs. It also does not study the water supply and 
sanitation organisations as created in the Water Service Act (1997) and whose 
functions are explicitly different from water resource management. Finally, 
this paper focuses on management organisations: it does not analyse the 
judiciary ones, e.g. the Water Court, since the latter play currently a marginal 
role in South Africa. 
 
The paper shows that, while in some situations there is an overlap between 
the WRMO functions and HDIs’ water related needs from the outset, it is not 
the case for other ones. In the latter cases, it could be legal possible to set up 
some cross-subsidization to finance water-related needs. The main forms of 
cross-subsidization found are actually to link the functions of the WRMO with 
either HDIs’ needs for employment, or their needs of organisation. In one 
example, some funds are proposed to support HDIs’ water needs, but they are 
not important and their existence is not entrenched in the core functions of the 
organization. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some elements 
explaining the rationale behind user-driven WRMOs. It also describes the 
functions of the South African WRMOs and shows why the CMA and the 
WUA, while having very different functions, can be analysed together with 
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regard to the focus of this paper. Then, a conceptualisation of smallholder 
needs with respect to water access is proposed, with some illustrations from 
selected case studies in South Africa. The last section uses this analytical 
framework to analyse the overlaps and discrepancies between the current 
HDIs’ needs and the current WRMOs’ functions. It investigates some 
solutions in cases where there is at first no overlap. Finally, the current 
process of definition of the WRMO functions during the participation process 
is discussed. 
 
2. USER-DRIVEN  WATER  RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS 
 
2.1 Rationale  of  user-driven organisations 
 
A user-driven WRMO is defined an organisation where the users are the ones 
taking the final decision: there might be some government representatives but 
the latter do not have the majority of votes. This situation is different from the 
case of a government agency merely undertaking a consultation process. The 
model of a user-driven WRMO bears its roots in the idea of managing a 
common property. For centuries, communities all around the world have been 
managing resources in common property, e.g. fisheries, rivers, pastures, 
forests (Ostrom et al, 1999). Such approach has been bit by bit extended to 
large basins, for instance in the Ruhr in Germany as soon as 1913 (Barraque, 
1995:28). User-driven organisations exist now in developed countries, like 
France and Australia (Barraque, 1995; McDonald & Young, 2000) as well as 
Brazil (Dourojeanni & Jouravlev, 2002). In some other middle-income 
countries, committees of users have a consultative role while the final decision 
remains in the hands of the State: Mexico (Wester  et al, 2003), Equator, 
Argentina and Costa-Rica (Bourlon & Berthon, 1998). Both the Dublin 
Statement on water (Principle 2, 1992) and the new European Water 
Framework Directive (Consideration 14, 2001) call for an in-depth 
participation of users in the decision-making process, even if they do not 
require that the WRMOs should be actually governed by the users. 
 
Several theoretical arguments support the move towards user-driven 
WRMOs. First, user-driven WRMOs can be efficient in situations where there 
is a risk of collectively inefficient use of the resource, known in economics as a 
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). In this kind of circumstances, the 
shift from an unmanaged to a managed situation can lead to a Pareto-
improvement for the group of water users. Many scholars have shown that in 
numerous situations user-driven organisations can be more efficient to 
organize the collective use of the resource than either the State or a system of 
private rights (e.g. Ostrom et al, 1999). Second, user-driven organisations are 
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of interest because they are more likely to (a) have the relevant information, 
(b) find innovative solutions through negotiations and (c) get users’ 
acceptance of the decisions taken than a top-down approach led by the 
government. In the field of economics, this concept was popularised under the 
name of the “Coase theorem”: if the water rights are completely defined and if 
the transaction costs are negligible, then organizing a discussion among the 
stakeholders will be able to lead to a Pareto-optimum (Coase, 1960).  
 
With respect to water management, an externality means that a user, by 
withdrawing water or discharging effluents, affects the water resource and 
hence also the other users. For instance, a user downstream can be affected by 
the activity of another user upstream, regarding either the quantity or the 
quality of water. Hereafter, an externality in water management will be 
defined only within a given distribution of rights: it corresponds to a situation 
where one gets an amount of water, in quantity or in quality, different from 
one’s right because of other users. Hence, a situation where somebody is 
limited by his or her water right and cannot get it increased because of the 
rights of other users will not be described as an externality. Solving a problem 
of externality regarding the quantity of water may be achieved for instance by 
taxing users according to the amount of water they withdraw and by using 
these taxes to build a dam upstream. 
 
In developing as well as in developed countries, the functions of user-driven 
WRMOs consists mainly of (a) dealing with externalities, (b) allocating the 
water licenses, and (c) increasing the resource. Such set of functions will be 
described hereafter as the international model.  
 
2.2 Water  resource  management  organisations in South Africa 
 
The CMA and the WUA are described by the NWA as two “water 
management institutions”, which share some common legal requirements 
regarding their management (Schedule 4 of the Act).  
 
At the broad catchment level, a CMA will be established to “delegate water 
resource management to the regional or catchment level” (NWA, 1998: 
Preamble of Chapter 7). For instance, the mission of the Olifants Water 
Management Area CMA is: “to assist in the protection, use, development, 
conservation, management and control of the water resources in the Olifants 
Water Management Area to ensure the maintenance of fitness for use on a 
sustainable basis for all users” (DWAF, 2003:3-13). The CMA will be 
responsible for the definition of a Catchment Management Strategy as well as 
for organizing the funding of its implementation. The CMA will also be 
  56Agrekon, Vol 43, No 1 (March 2004)  Faysse 
 
 
responsible for issuing and modifying the water licences (Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), 1999b). However, DWAF will retain this 
function in the short term, especially in places where there is a need to review 
completely the allocation pattern.  The CMA should not be a priori 
responsible for managing the waterworks (Pegram & Palmer, 2001). There 
will be one CMA for each of the 19 water management areas of South Africa. 
The users will not be in charge of the day-to-day management. They will seat 
at the Governing Board, which will take the strategic decisions, and where 
there will be also representatives of the national and provincial government 
(DWAF, 1999b). The CMA is a classic WRMO at the catchment level: its 
responsibilities as well as its funding are similar to existing organisations in 
France or Australia. 
 
At the local level, the WUAs “operate at a restricted localised level, and are in 
effect co-operative associations of individual water users who wish to 
undertake water-related activities for [members’] mutual benefits” (NWA, 
1998: Preamble of Chapter 8). These WUAs are fully managed and controlled 
by water users, even if the NWA provides DWAF with some means to 
monitor their activities. The core activity of a Water User Association is to 
operate the waterworks under its responsibility and to monitor the allocation 
of water among its members. The WUA cannot change these allocations. All 
the already existing IBs are supposed to be transformed into WUAs (NWA, 
1998: Section 98). The shift to these new organisations should crystallize a 
move from a purely commercial farmers’ organisation to one that will include 
all water users of the same resource. These large-scale WUAs may undertake 
ancillary functions, for instance regarding the integrated management of 
water resources.  
 
3.  A TYPOLOGY OF NEEDS IN WATER USE 
 
This section first proposes a typology of needs regarding water, followed by 
an assessment of the most important water-related problems faced by HDIs in 
some case studies in South Africa. 
 
3.1  Types of water access 
Getting access to water requires that two types of access are met in the same 
time: (i) a legal water access, i.e. the entitlement to withdraw a given amount 
of water at a given quality from a river or a canal, and (ii) a technical and 
financial water access, i.e. the availability of an equipment to bring water from 
the river to either the field or the village as well as the ability to pay the 
corresponding cost of distribution. These two types of access will be more or 
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less linked depending on the possibility to trade water licences. In countries 
where a market is fully authorized, the two types of access are actually linked: 
one can buy a legal access to water, for instance in California (Svendsen, 2000). 
The distinction becomes relevant when only intra-sectoral markets are 
authorized, and becomes really clear if water markets are not authorized at all 
(for example France or Indonesia). According to the typology of river basin 
development proposed by Molden et al (2000), the technical and financial 
water access will tend to be more important than the legal one if the basin is 
still open, i.e. it is still possible to mobilize new water resources. It will be the 
opposite if the basin is closed. 
3.1.1  The legal water access 
In some places, the user main concern relates to the management of the water 
allocation. It happens either when smallholders need to defend their existing 
rights or when they need more water rights.  
a) Improvement within the given water allocation pattern 
In some situations, the user welfare can be improved within a given water 
allocation pattern. There can be an improvement in two types of situation: the 
day-to-day management of water resources and the possible gaps between 
theoretical and real allocations. Regarding the day-to-day management, the 
water licences only describe the amount of water a user is entitled to 
withdraw during normal situations.  In case of drought or accident (e.g. 
breakdown of a pump), a scarcity will occur and the water resource will often 
have to be shared with temporary rules that will be negotiated at the time of 
the accident. Users may be empowered to have a voice in this discussion. 
Besides, there may also be a difference between the formal allocation and the 
real one. For instance, in a certain irrigation scheme in India, the large-scale 
users upstream use more water than they are entitled to during normal flow 
(Mollinga & Van Straaten, 1996). This gap may also take place in a problem of 
pollution: the user downstream can claim his or her legal right to get clean 
water against the polluter upstream. For example, in India, a local community 
claimed its historical right to clean water, in a situation of pollution by textile 
factories upstream (Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2000:364). Overall, this situation 
corresponds to the management of externalities. 
b) Change of the water licence allocation pattern 
Another possible constraint for the user is a lack of water licences, either 
because the already existing emerging farmers would like to increase their 
areas under irrigation, or because other people would like to start farming and 
require new licences (for instance to get a loan from a bank). Both cases can be 
found in the Inkomati Basin (Faysse et al, 2003). If the basin is still open, then 
providing legal access to users can be achieved simply by increasing the 
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available resource, e.g. building a dam. Otherwise, if the basin is closed, the 
legal access will have to be found through a decrease of other users’ licences.  
3.1.2  The technical and financial water access 
The water user may need to pay a fee to get water (for instance, the fee 
required by a WUA) or may need to invest in equipment in order to withdraw 
water and to use it for production, for instance farming, or for home 
consumption. This setting may correspond to two types of situations. First, the 
smallholders may have a legal access, but not the technical and financial one. 
For instance, the Arabie scheme in the Olifants Water Management Area use a 
very small portion of their formal water rights because of many internal 
problems (technical access to water, land tenure, etc.) (Kamara et al, 2002). 
Second, smallholders may have neither of the two, for example the numerous 
demands to get water licences to start a farming activity in the Inkomati Basin 
(Faysse et al, 2003). 
This typology of water needs can be used to describe a current situation. 
However, the situations that are analysed can clearly evolve. If users’ needs 
are progressively met, their needs could for instance be at first one of 
investment, afterwards one of getting more water rights and finally one of 
solving externality related problems. Finally, both the CMA and the WUA are 
organisations whose primary functions are to deal with legal water access. 
Since the paper studies to what extent the HDIs face problems related to legal 
water access, the following analysis will study the two organisations in the same 
approach, even if the CMA and the WUA core functions are clearly different. 
 
3.2  Relative importance of the different water-related problems for HDIs 
in selected case studies in South Africa 
 
Several places where large-scale and small-scale users share the same resource 
have been investigated (Figure 1). First, a research has been undertaken on 
several case studies of IBs transforming into WUAs, in places where there is a 
significant presence of HDIs: the Komati and Lomati IBs in Mpumalanga, the 
Great Letaba WUA in Limpopo Province, the Lower Olifants WUA in 
Western Cape and the Umlass IB in KwaZulu-Natal (Faysse et al, 2003; Faysse, 
2003). Other IBs transforming into WUAs have been studied though a 
literature review:  the Kat River WUA (McMaster, 2003) in Eastern Cape and 
the Stompdrift-Kamanassie WUA in Western Cape (Wellman, 2001). Finally, a 
literature review investigated the process of creation of the Lepelle CMA in 
the Olifants Water Management Area3 (DWAF, 2003; Kamara et al, 2002; 
 
3 Hereafter the Olifants River will designate the one situated North-East of Pretoria. The 
term Lower Olifants will designate the case study in Western Cape. 
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Perret, 2002), including more specifically the Steelpoort River, a tributary of 
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Figure 1:  Selected case studies in South Africa 
 
Actually it is possible to define 4 categories of HDIs water user: (i) the 
emerging farmers designate the small-scale farmers who have a water licence 
or who are supposed to get one soon, (ii) the upcoming farmers are persons 
who would like to start farming but are compelled to wait, for instance 
because of a lack of water licence, (iii) the rural communities, and (iv) the farm 
workers living in the farm. The rural community encompasses the drinking 
water users as well as the small-scale users who, under the Schedule 1 of the 
NWA, do not need a formal water licence, i.e. “reasonable domestic use, small 
gardening not for commercial purposes and the watering of animals”. The 
following analysis will only consider the farmers and the rural communities. 
These different case studies were analysed to assess the problems with regard 
to water needs as reported by the HDIs. In a very broad manner, two 
situations are distinguished. First, a water-related need can be a general 
problem, widely recognized by the HDIs’ community. This community will be 
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ready to organize itself in order to participate in meetings to solve this 
problem. Second, the water-related need may be satisfied overall in the HDIs’ 
community. There may be some persons who face a problem with regard to 
this need, but the problem is not of enough importance to federate the 
community to engage these problems. 
Assessing the needs of a group of users is a very difficult task. The 
methodology used in the fieldwork and the review of literature does not 
attempt to provide an in-depth assessment of these needs. However, it was 
sufficient to assess the widely recognized HDIs’ needs. 
In 7 cases studied out of the 10, the HDIs community experiences widely 
recognized legal water access problems. In the Komati and Lomati IBs, 
existing emerging farmers as well as possible upcoming ones are requesting 
water licences to start or increase their farming activities (Anderson, 2002; 
Faysse et al, 2003). Emerging farmers as well as a rural community need to be 
part of the day-to-day management of the dams (Faysse et al, 2003). The same 
situation occurs in the Kat River (McMaster, 2003). In the Lower Olifants 
WUA (Western Cape), a HDI community situated downstream the canal 
operated by the WUA does not get the water it is entitled to (a dam is 
currently being built and should alleviate the problem, Faysse et al, 2003). The 
same problem is mentioned in the Stompdrift-Kamanassie WUA (Wellman, 
2001). Emerging farmers of the Boschkloof irrigation scheme along the 
Steelpoort River  complain of a lack of water in winter due to commercial 
farming and mining upstream (Stimie et al, 2000). Some rural communities of 
the Steelpoort River Basin drink water directly from the Steelpoort River and 
complain about pollutions created upstream by mines, commercial farmers 
and settlements (Ardorino, 2002). Finally, the smallholder schemes in the 
Great Letaba River are mainly facing problems of land tenure and of poor 
capacity of the distribution network. Due to a specific local setting, these 
emerging farmers should not face as many water restrictions as the 
commercial farmers: they need to be part of the day-to-day management to 
make sure that this right is enforced (Faysse et al, 2003). In all cases, HDIs 
stress as an important problem the lack of funds for infrastructure 
development and maintenance or for paying the water distribution fees. 
In the cases of the Umlaas IB and the Lepelle CMA, HDIs do not report 
problems of legal water access. In the Umlaas IB, there are almost no 
emerging farmers. The upstream rural communities are not affected by 
commercial farmers’ water use. Downstream, the Hopewell community is still 
using water from the river for drinking purpose, and hence is concerned by 
water quality issues, but this problem should be solved when the policy of 
providing 6,000 l/household/month free is set up in this place (Faysse et al, 
2003). In the Olifants River Basin, some meetings of a Stakeholder Reference 
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Group were held to set up the CMA. During these meetings as well as during 
some other local forums, the HDIs were invited to state their needs with 
regard to water. The HDIs put forward a need of investment for water supply 
and sanitation as well as financial support for their farming activities (DWAF, 
2003: Appendix B). Almost no one complained of a lack of water in the river 
itself or a problem of water quality in the river. The situation faced in the 
Olifants River Basin is actually happening in many other places. Due to the 
reduction of parastatals’ activities after 1994 and subsequent closure, most of 
the 250 small-scale irrigation schemes in the former homelands are struggling 
to break even. In most of these schemes, the legal water access is not the 
leading constraint: farmers still have to solve many internal issues (access to 
market, land tenure, etc.) before the legal water access becomes a constraint 
(Shah et al, 2002). By comparison, large-scale users face above all legal water 
access problems and rarely technical and financial ones. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the problems faced by HDIs water users and 
large-scale users in the different reviewed cases. 
 
Table 1:  Widely  recognized  problems for HDIs’ communities and large-
scale users: some examples 
Users 
HDIs’ community 































































































































































































Need of water licence 
          
Need to be part of the day-to-
day management 
             
Water in the river or the canal 
lesser than what it is supposed 
to be 
              
Legal water 
access 
Water quality in the river lesser 
than what it is supposed to be 




Need of funds for infrastructure 
maintenance and development 
and water distribution fees 
                 
  Widely recognized problem  Not a problem (except isolated cases) 
 
There may be situations of pollution, which create a problem of water quality, 
with users not being aware of the problem. For instance, there are some 
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pollution problems by heavy metals in the Steelpoort River (DWAF, 2003: 
Appendix C:4-5), but the HDIs’ community is not aware of them (Ardorino, 
2002). However, this community is aware of pollution problems (silt, lack of 
proper sanitation upstream) hence they already stress pollution as a water-
related problem. 
 
4. ACHIEVING  AN  OVERLAP  BETWEEN WATER RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS’ FUNCTIONS AND HDIs’ 
NEEDS 
 
The WRMOs are sustainable only if they meet core needs of the users. Large-
scale users have important legal water access problems: they are interested to 
join both the CMA and the WUA. In the same way, the WRMOs will 
incorporate in a sustainable way the HDIs only if the former address one at 
least of HDIs’ problems. This point does not imply that every single HDIs’ 
water need should be addressed by a WRMO. DWAF and the Municipalities 
are responsible for water supply and sanitation in the rural areas; the 
Department of Agriculture and DWAF are responsible for investment in 
infrastructure in smallholder irrigation, etc.  
 
As it has been seen in section 2, coping with situations where users’ water 
needs relate to legal water access - either because of an externality or because 
of a need to get a (larger) water licence - belongs to the functions of WRMOs 
adopted worldwide (cf. section 2). When HDIs face such problems, there is a 
clear overlap between the WRMO functions and the HDIs’ water needs.  
 
This study has assessed two situations (one CMA, one IB) where HDIs do not 
f a c e  w i d e l y  r e c o g n i z e d  p r o b l e m s  o f  l e gal water access. In these situations, 
there is a priori no overlap between the functions of the WRMO, as described 
in the international model, and the needs of the HDIs. A first possibility, 
which is discussed here, is to organize cross-subsidization within the WRMO. 
Actually, in the two previous cases, there is some form of cross-subsidization. 
However, it is not directed towards the investment in waterworks (dams, 
pipes, drinking water networks, etc.). These solutions will be presented 
hereafter.  
 
4.1 The  legal  possibility  of cross-subsidization 
 
Several South African policy documents dealing with these issues were 
reviewed to assess the legal possibility of cross-subsidization: the National 
Water Act, the Water Pricing Strategy (DWAF, 1999a), the Guidelines for 
financing CMAs in South Africa (Pegram & Palmer, 2001), the Proposal for the 
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Establishment of a CMA for the Inkomati Basin (New Format) (MBB et al, 
2001) and two Guides edited by DWAF regarding “the Transformation of IBs 
and certain other Boards into WUAs” and on “Establishing a WUA” (DWAF, 
2000a and 2000b).4 
 
Regarding the emerging farmers belonging to government water schemes, the 
Pricing Strategy (DWAF, 1999a:34) declares that “the catchment management 
and operation and maintenance fees, plus a surcharge of 10% as contained in 
the agreement with the SAAU5 should be phased in over a period of five 
years”. Nevertheless, such a –short-term- subsidy will only help farmers who 
are constrained by the water fee: it will be of no use for the farmers that need 
investments in infrastructure. 
 
The NWA states that a WRMO – a CMA or a WUA- should devise a business 
plan, which must include a financial target. “In preparing or revising a 
financial target, the board must have regard to (…) the need to maintain a 
reasonable level of reserves, especially to provide for corrective action to 
redress the results of past racial and gender discrimination in the use of the 
resource” (NWA, 1998: Section 24 of Schedule 4). Hence, the NWA sets a 
possibility of cross-subsidization, but without giving any requirements, for 
instance in terms of the share of the total budget. 
 
Regarding more specifically the CMA, since the CMAs have not started yet, 
one has to look at the policy documents. The use of the CMA’s fees to invest 
in technical and financial access is rendered possible by the NWA. The NWA 
states that “in performing its functions a CMA must be mindful of the 
constitutional imperative to redress the results of past racial and gender 
discrimination and to achieve equitable access for all to the water resource 
under its control” (NWA, 1998: Section 79). However, the report made for the 
Water Research Commission, which provides “Guidelines for financing 
CMAs in South Africa”, does not consider the possibility of CMA funding 
technical and financial water access (Pegram & Palmer, 2001). In the same 
way, the current proposals for establishing a CMA in the Inkomati (MBB et al, 
2001) and in the Mvoti to Umzimkulu (Wilson & Associates, 2002) water 
management areas do not refer to cross-subsidization in their functions (some 
form of cross-subsidization is proposed in the Lepelle CMA, cf. hereafter). 
 
 
4 Regarding pricing issues, the National Water Resource Strategy does not add to the NWA 
and the 1999 Pricing Strategy. 
5 South African Agricultural Union. 
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At the WUA level, the fee charged by the WUA should be basically used to 
achieve actions “of mutual benefits” (NWA, 1998: Preamble of Chapter 8). The 
initial goal of a WUA is to distribute water according to existing allocations 
and to maintain waterworks. Currently, it is still under discussion whether 
the goal of uplifting HDIs should be an ancillary function (in which case the 
WUA is free to determine itself the budget dedicated to this action) or a 
principal one. The “Guide on the Transformation of IBs and certain other 
Boards into WUAs” and the one regarding “establishing a WUA” do not 
tackle this issue (DWAF 2000a; 2000b). 
 
In conclusion, apart from the requirements for the Business Plan of a WRMO 
as stated in the Schedule 4 of the NWA, there is no statement regarding 
whether these WRMOs should be compelled, or not, to organize cross-
subsidization. If some cross-subsidization is to be set up, it will be necessary 
to provide more detailed requirements, for instance a given share of the 
budget dedicated to cross-subsidization. More generally, one of the purposes 
of the NWA is to “promote equitable access to water” (Section 2). 
Nonetheless, the implications regarding the duties of a WRMO will be 
different if the word “access” in the previous sentence is understood as only a 
legal one, or if it incorporates also the technical and financial ones.  
 
The review made for this paper did not find any evidence of a country where 
user-driven and user-funded WRMOs are required by the government to 
invest in technical and financial water access for the poorer users in the name 
of redressing inequities. The international model of WRMO manages the river 
as a common, the main functions being then to solve externality related 
problems or to allocate water, e.g. to make sure that there is not over-
pumping in the river, or that the effluents are of a correct quality. On the 
contrary, a WRMO that would choose to invest in developing the 
infrastructure of a small-scale farmers scheme would then increase the 
amount of water withdrawn from the river. 
 
Requiring cross-subsidization at the WRMO level has both advantages and 
drawbacks. On the one hand, it enables a real participation of HDIs in these 
situations where HDIs do not face widely recognized legal water access 
problems. Moreover, large-scale users may accept more easily to finance 
actions on which they can have a word and where they can see the results. On 
the other hand, there is a risk of blurring the core functions of water resource 
management. Besides, the needs of HDIs will change in the future: an 
optimistic scenario may be that small-scale users will gradually meet their 
needs for infrastructure. In such a situation, it could be considered that cross-
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subsidization is set up for a limited period. Afterwards, the WRMO would 
join the international model. 
 
Among the cases studied, there is no cross-subsidisation in terms of financial 
help for infrastructure development, maintenance or payment of water 
distribution fees. However, the Gamtoos WUA charged the HDIs only 5 
percent of the cost charged to other irrigators (Mullineux, private 
communication). The WUAs and the CMAs invest on the other hand in the 
capacity building of the HDIs. This capacity building might be related to the 
water resource management in the Lomati IB, a translator is hired for the 
meetings. In the Mlazi River, the Environment Officer hired by the IB 
provides some training on environment management. The capacity building 
might also be on broader issues: the Mdloti Catchment Management Forum 
trained young people in local tourism activities (Wilson & Associates, 
2002:18). 
 
4.2  Some cross-subsidization, but not for investment in water works 
 
In both of the two cases studied where HDIs do not face widely recognized 
problems of legal water access, the WRMO organizes cross-subsidization to a 
certain degree, but not for the development of waterworks.  
 
The Umlaas IB needs to limit erosion in the upper part of the catchment. 
Therefore, it has actively participated in organizing a successful dialogue with 
the rural communities upstream, around conservation projects. Most of these 
projects are funded by the Working for Water programme; some of them by 
the IB itself (Faysse et al, 2003). These projects meet the rural communities’ 
needs of employment. 
 
In the case of the Lepelle CMA, the issue of overlap is not addressed in the 
proposal (DWAF, 2003). However, the proposal aims at enabling an 
organisation of the small-scale users community. This organisation might in 
turn bear some fruits. 
 
Because of the difficulty faced to get small-scale users represented, the CMA 
proposal for the Olifants Water Management Area intends to set up many 
Small-Scale Water User Forums (DWAF, 2003: Appendix B: B-4, B-28). These 
forums will be organized at a very localised level. In some preparatory 
meetings, the small-scale users were asked to state what they would expect 
from such forums. They answered that the functions should be to improve the 
organisation of the users as well as to serve as a body to represent their 
interest. Almost none of the many expectations related in the minutes of the 
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preparatory meetings relate to a legal water access problem (DWAF, 2003: 
Appendix B). Users stressed the need of financial help, even in the Steelpoort 
River Basin where problems of water scarcity and pollution are reported 
elsewhere. 
 
The small-scale water user forums will be used basically to (a) organize small-
scale users, (b) link with the government departments for technical and 
financial water access issues, (c) organize some activities within the forum, 
and (d) report externality problem among small-scale users participating in 
the same forum or with users outside the forum.  
 
The CMA proposal schedules a budget to enable the organisation of these 
Small-Scale Water User Forums (SSWUFs) as well as a budget to support their 
activities. A total annual budget of SAR 983,000 is proposed, out of an overall 
CMA budget of around SAR 18 million. The budget per forum for supporting 
the forum activities will be enough to undertake: some capacity building 
activities, some community mobilization (e.g. the Water for Food movement 
which promotes the development of garden plots at household level) or 
studies (e.g. marketing). However, the proposed budget will not be enough to 
undertake any investments in infrastructure development or maintenance. 
Some local catchment forums in South Africa are involved in a local 
development project and have their words in the use of certain funds, for 
instance the Working for Water project in the Mlazi River or a road 
development program in the Kat River (McMaster, 2002). These projects are 
key elements for the viability of these forums. In the Olifants Water 
Management Area, the funds currently scheduled for the activities within the 
forums may not be sufficient to constitute a drive. Therefore, to ensure that 
these SSWUFs will be sustainable in the future, it may be of importance that 
they become a real place of interaction between the different government 
departments and the users. 
 
There may be a disconnection between the Catchment Management 
Committees, which will deal mainly with externality issues among large-scale 
users, and the SSWUFs. Indeed, on the one hand, externality issues with other 
users in the catchment will not be important issues in the SSWUFs, at least in 
the short term. On the other hand, the problems of pollution and water use in 
the Olifants are basically a problem among large-scale users: mines, 
industries, commercial agriculture and natural reserves. The HDIs use a small 
amount of water compared to these users and their pollution is much less a 
concern than the one of the mines. 
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All in all, the Lepelle CMA proposes to dedicate some funds to HDIs’ 
d e v e l o p m e n t ,  m o s t  o f  w h i c h  b e i n g  u s e d  t o  s e t  u p  f o r u m s  a s  p l a c e s  o f  
expression and coordination of HDIs’ water related needs. Among the initial 
functions, only the support of the organization and participation of 
smallholder is proposed (DWAF 2003:3-15). The general aim of supporting 
small-scale water users is a delegated function, i.e. a function on which the 
Governing Board has a prerogative to “decide on an implementation strategy” 
(DWAF 2003:3-16, 3-17). Therefore, only the task of helping the organization 
of HDIs is entrenched as a core function.  
 
4.3  How are the functions of the WRMOs decided? 
 
The public participation process is an opportunity for HDIs to ask that their 
needs are taken into account in the CMA functions. For instance, in the 
Inkomati Basin, some smallholders threatened to step back from the Inkomati 
CMA process if the issue of getting water entitlements was not declared as 
part of the responsibilities of the CMA in the short term (Waalewijn, 2002). In 
the Olifants River Basin, HDIs asked for investments in water supply and 
sanitation and in irrigation infrastructures. However, the question of cross-
subsidization is often seen as something that might be started in the future, 
when the organisation is well-functioning, rather than an issue that should be 
discussed from the outset. It is hence not part of the agenda of the meetings.  
Moreover, this issue of overlap between functions and needs has been blurred 
for the past years because of the difficulty to achieve a public participation 
process, and especially because of the lack of organisation and expertise of the 
HDIs’ community. At the meeting of the Olifants River Basin stakeholder 
reference group in February 2002, when the HDIs’ representatives asked for 
investments in water supply and sanitation, their proposal to add this task to 
the functions of the CMA was dismissed on the ground that, first, it was not 
part of the management of water resources. Second, if HDIs proposed these 
functions, it was basically because they did not understand what was the 
management of water resources- and what was not. However, if HDIs’ 
representatives fail to distinguish water resource management from 
investments in water supply and sanitation and in irrigation schemes, it is also 
because they are not constrained by a lack of water in the river or a problem of 
pollution. One could expect that, in a situation where HDIs would not be able 
to pump water from the river because a large-scale user pumps too much 
water upstream, they would more easily understand the rationale behind the 
management of water resources. In the same way, in the Inkomati Basin, the 
emerging farmers were in a strong need of new licences and participated 
actively in the debates (Anderson, 2002). 
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There is a need to improve the public participation process. In the Olifants, the 
HDIs stated their more important needs, i.e. ones of investment. This stress 
has overshadowed the possible other externality-related problems. It is 
relevant to let the HDIs talk about their general water-related issues: in many 
places, it is the first time they have an opportunity to have a voice. Such 
information may be used under the WRMO role as a coordinator with 
financing organizations. However, it would be also necessary to ask HDIs 
specifically about their legal water access problems, i.e. to what extent they 
are limited either by a lack of water licence, or by having less water in the 





South Africa has set very ambitious goals in terms of involving the users – and 
especially the small-scale ones – in the management of water resource. To 
achieve these goals, the best practices around the world were examined, and 
the 1998 NWA laid ground for the creation of two user-driven WRMOs: the 
CMA and the WUA. This paper analysed some challenges faced to get a 
successful participation of HDIs in large-scale WRMOs. The focus was the 
assessment of the existing overlap between HDIs’ water needs and the 
WRMO functions. The international model of WRMO core functions 
addresses the legal water needs, by tackling externality problems, harnessing 
new resources or by allocating water licences. It appears that in several cases 
in South Africa, these core functions do not meet any of the problems of HDIs’ 
with regard to water. In these situations, these users need above all funds, for 
instance in order to invest in their water distribution network and maintain it. 
If this problem is not addressed, there is a risk of HDIs losing interest in 
participating in the WRMO. While cross-subsidization is legally possible, 
there is no specific requirement and it is actually not used in the cases studied 
for the development of water works. In these cases, some funds are to be 
dedicated to small-scale development initiatives within the smallholder 
forums. Other funds are to be used to tackle HDIs’ needs other than the 
technical and financial water access need: need of employment or need of 
organisation and capacity building. In the absence of specific funds to cater for 
HDIs’ needs for investment in waterworks, the involvement of HDIs in the 
WRMO will be sustainable all the more if the latter serves as a platform for 
fruitful discussions with the organisations responsible for answering their 
technical and financial water needs. 
 
There may be the view that the WRMOs may undertake cross-subsidization in 
the long term, once they are well-established organisations. The present 
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analysis shows that, in some places, the issue of going into cross-subsidization 
or not should be addressed from the outset. 
 
This study shows also that the needs of HDIs vis-à-vis water can vary a lot 
from one place to another. It is useful to include such an assessment of the 
needs in the public participation process used to set up the WRMOs, 
especially in order to differentiate the legal water access problems from the 
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